This document specifies HMAC hardware IP functionality. This module conforms to the OpenTitan guideline for peripheral device functionality. See that document for integration overview within the broader OpenTitan top level system.
The HMAC module is a SHA-256 hash based authentication code generator to check the integrity of an incoming message and a signature signed with the same secret key. It generates a different authentication code with the same message if the secret key is different.
This HMAC implementation is not hardened against side channel or fault injection attacks. It is meant purely for hashing acceleration. If hardened MAC operations are required, users should use either KMAC or a software implementation.
The 256-bit secret key is written in KEY_0 to KEY_7. The message to authenticate is written to MSG_FIFO and the HMAC generates a 256-bit digest value which can be read from DIGEST_0 to DIGEST_7. The hash_done interrupt is raised to report to software that the final digest is available.
The HMAC IP can run in SHA-256-only mode, whose purpose is to check the correctness of the received message. The same digest registers above are used to represent the hash result. SHA-256 mode doesn't use the given secret key. It generates the same result with the same message every time.
The software doesn't need to provide the message length. The HMAC IP will calculate the length of the message received between 1 being written to CMD.hash_start and 1 being written to CMD.hash_process.
This version doesn‘t have many defense mechanisms but is able to wipe internal variables such as the secret key, intermediate hash results H, digest and the message FIFO. It does not wipe the software accessible 16x32b FIFO. The software can wipe the variables by writing a 32-bit random value into WIPE_SECRET register. The internal variables will be reset to the written value. This version of the HMAC doesn’t have a internal pseudo-random number generator to derive the random number from the written seed number.
A later update may provide an interface for external hardware IPs, such as a key manager, to update the secret key. It will also have the ability to send the digest directly to a shared internal bus.
The HMAC block diagram above shows that the HMAC core converts the secret key registers into an inner padded key and an outer padded key which are fed to the hash engine when appropriate. The module also feeds the result of the first round message (which uses the inner padded key) from the SHA-256 hash engine into the 16x32b FIFO for the second round (which uses the outer padded key). The message length is automatically updated to reflect the size of the outer padded key and first round digest result for the second round. See Design Details for more information.
The SHA-256 (SHA-2) block diagram shows the message FIFO inside SHA-256, hash registers, digest registers, and SHA-256 compression function. The message FIFO is not software accessible but is fed from the 16x32b FIFO seen in the HMAC block diagram via the HMAC core. The HMAC core can forward the message directly from the 16x32b FIFO if HMAC is not enabled. This message is padded with length appended to fit the 512-bit block size as described in the SHA-256 specification.
With the 512-bit block, the compress function runs 64 rounds to calculate the block hash, which is stored in the hash registers above. After 64 rounds are completed, the SHA-256 updates the digest registers with the addition of the hash result and the previous digest registers.
A message is fed via a memory-mapped message FIFO. Any write access to the memory-mapped window MSG_FIFO updates the message FIFO. If the FIFO is full, the HMAC block will block any writes leading to back-pressure on the interconnect (as opposed to dropping those writes or overwriting existing FIFO contents). It is recommended this back-pressure is avoided by not writing to the memory-mapped message FIFO when it is full. To avoid doing so, software can read the STATUS.fifo_full register.
The logic assumes the input message is little-endian. It converts the byte order of the word right before writing to SHA2 storage as SHA2 treats the incoming message as big-endian. If SW wants to convert the message byte order, SW should set CFG.endian_swap to 1. The byte order of the digest registers, from DIGEST_0 to DIGEST_7 can be configured with CFG.digest_swap.
See the table below:
Input Msg #0: 010203h Input Msg #1: 0405h
| endian_swap | 0 | 1 |
|---|---|---|
| Push to SHA2 #0 | 03020105h | 01020304h |
| Push to SHA2 #1 | 00000004h | 00000005h |
Small writes to MSG_FIFO are coalesced with into 32-bit words by the [packer logic]({{< relref “hw/ip/prim/doc/prim_packer” >}}). These words are fed into the internal message FIFO. While passing writes to the packer logic, the block also counts the number of bytes that are being passed. This gives the received message length, which is used in HMAC and SHA-256 as part of the hash computation.
The SHA-256 module computes an intermediate hash for every 512-bit block. The message must be padded to fill 512-bit blocks. This is done with an initial 1 bit after the message bits with a 64-bit message length at the end and enough 0 bits in the middle to result in a full block.The SHA-256 specification describes this in more detail. An example is shown below. The padding logic handles this so software only needs to write the actual message bits into the FIFO.
For instance, if the message is empty, the message length is 64-bit 0. In this case, the padding logic gives 0x80000000 into the SHA-256 module first. Then it sends (512 - 32 - 64)/32, 13 times of 0x00000000 for Padding 0x00. Lastly, it returns the message length which is 64-bit 0x00000000_00000000. If incomplete words are written, the packet logic appends 0x80 in the proper byte location. Such as 0xXX800000 for the message length % 4B == 1 case.
The SHA-256 engine receives 16 32-bit words from the message FIFO or the HMAC core then begins 64 rounds of the hash computation which is also called compression. In each round, the compression function fetches 32 bits from the buffer and computes the internal variables. The first 16 rounds are fed by the words from the message FIFO or the HMAC core. Input for later rounds comes from shuffling the given 512-bit block. Details are well described in Wikipedia and the SHA-256 specification.
With the given hash values, 4 byte message, and round constants, the compression function computes the next round hash values. The 64 32-bit round constants are hard-wired in the design. After the compression at the last round is finished, the resulting hash values are added into the digest. The digest, again, is used as initial hash values for the next 512-bit block compression. During the compression rounds, it doesn't fetch data from the message FIFO. The software can push up to 16 entries to the FIFO for the next hash computation.
HMAC can be used with any hash algorithm but this version of HMAC IP only uses SHA-256. The first phase of HMAC calculates the SHA-256 hash of the inner secret key concatenated with the actual message to be authenticated. This inner secret key is created with a 256-bit (hashed) secret key and 0x36 pad.
inner_pad_key = {key[255:0], 256'h0} ^ {64{8'h36}} // big-endian
The message length used in the SHA-256 module is calculated by the HMAC core by adding 512 to the original message length (to account for the length of inner_pad_key, which has been prepended to the message).
The first round digest is fed into the second round in HMAC. The second round computes the hash of the outer secret key concatenated with the first round digest. As the result of SHA-256 is 256-bits, it must be padded to fit into 512-bit block size.
outer_pad_key = {key[255:0], 256'h0} ^ {64{8'h5c}} // big-endian
In the second round, the message length is a fixed 768 bits.
HMAC assumes the secret key is 256-bit. The onus is on software to shrink the key to 256-bit using a hash function when setting up the HMAC. For example, common key sizes may be 2048-bit or 4096-bit. Software must hash these and write the hashed results to the HMAC.
The SHA-256 hash algorithm computes 512 bits of data at a time. The first 16 rounds need the actual 16 x 32-bit message and the following 48 rounds need some value derived from the message.
In these 48 rounds, the software can feed the next 16 x 32-bit message block. But, once the FIFO is full, the software cannot push more data until the current block is processed. This version of the IP fetches the next 16 x 32-bit message after completing the current block. As such, it takes 80 cycles to complete a block. The effective throughput considering this is 64 byte / 80 clk or 16 clk / 80 clk, 20% of the maximum throughput. For instance, if the clock frequency is 100MHz, the SHA-256 can hash out 80MB/s at most.
This throughput could be enhanced in a future version by feeding the message into the internal buffer when the round hits 48, eliminating the extra 16 cycles to feed the message after completing a block.
If HMAC mode is turned on, it introduces extra latency due to the second round of computing the final hash of the outer key and the result of the first round using the inner key. This adds an extra 240 cycles (80 for the inner key, 80 for the outer key, and 80 for the result of the first round) to complete a message. For instance, if an empty message is given then it takes 360 cycles (80 for msg itself and 240 for the extra) to get the HMAC authentication token.
The MSG_FIFO in the HMAC IP has a wide address range not just one 4 byte address. Any writes to the address range go into the single entry point of the prim_packer. Then prim_packer compacts the data into the word-size if not a word-write then writes to the MSG_FIFO. This is different from a conventional memory-mapped FIFO.
By having wide address range pointing to a single entry point, the FIFO can free software from the fixed address restriction. For instance, the core can use “store multiple” commands to feed the message fifo efficiently. Also, a DMA engine which might not have the ability to be configured to the fixed write and incremental read may benefit from this behavior.
This chapter shows how to use the HMAC-SHA256 IP by showing some snippets such as initialization, initiating SHA-256 or HMAC process and processing the interrupts. This code is not compilable but serves to demonstrate the IO required. More detailed and complete code can be found in the software under sw/, ROM code and HMAC DIF.
This section of the code describes initializing the HMAC-SHA256, setting up the interrupts, endianness, and HMAC, SHA-256 mode. CFG.endian_swap reverses the byte-order of input words when software writes into the message FIFO. CFG.digest_swap reverses the byte-order in the final HMAC or SHA hash.
void hmac_init(unsigned int endianess, unsigned int digest_endian) { HMAC_CFG(0) = HMAC_CFG_SHA_EN | HMAC_CFG_HMAC_EN | (endianess << HMAC_CFG_ENDIAN_SWAP_LSB) | (digest_endian << HMAC_CFG_DIGEST_SWAP_LSB); // Enable interrupts if needed. // If secret key is static, you can put the key here HMAC_KEY_0 = SECRET_KEY_0; HMAC_KEY_1 = SECRET_KEY_1; HMAC_KEY_2 = SECRET_KEY_2; HMAC_KEY_3 = SECRET_KEY_3; HMAC_KEY_4 = SECRET_KEY_4; HMAC_KEY_5 = SECRET_KEY_5; HMAC_KEY_6 = SECRET_KEY_6; HMAC_KEY_7 = SECRET_KEY_7; }
The following code shows how to send a message to the HMAC, the procedure is the same whether a full HMAC or just a SHA-256 calculation is required (choose between them using CFG.hmac_en). In both cases the SHA-256 engine must be enabled using CFG.sha_en (once all other configuration has been properly set). If the message is bigger than 512-bit, the software must wait until the FIFO isn't full before writing further bits.
void run_hmac(uint32_t *msg, uint32_t msg_len, uint32_t *hash) { // Initiate hash: hash_start REG32(HMAC_CMD(0)) = (1 << HMAC_CMD_HASH_START); // write the message: below example assumes word-aligned access for (uint32_t written = 0 ; written < (msg_len >> 3) ; written += 4) { while((REG32(HMAC_STATUS(0)) >> HMAC_STATUS_FIFO_FULL) & 0x1) ; // Any write data from HMAC_MSG_FIFO_OFFSET to HMAC_MSG_FIFO_SIZE // is written to the message FIFO REG32(HMAC_MSG_FIFO(0)) = *(msg+(written/4)); } // Completes hash: hash_process REG32(HMAC_CMD(0)) = (1 << HMAC_CMD_HASH_PROCESS); while(0 == (REG32(HMAC_INTR_STATE(0)) >> HMAC_INTR_STATE_HMAC_DONE) & 0x1); REG32(HMAC_INTR_STATE(0)) = 1 << HMAC_INTR_STATE_HMAC_DONE; // Read the digest for (int i = 0 ; i < 8 ; i++) { *(hash + i) = REG32(HMAC_DIGEST_0(0) + (i << 2)); } }
The HMAC IP prevents CFG and KEY registers from updating while the engine is processing messages. Such attempts are discarded. The KEY register ignores any attempt to access the secret key in the middle of the process. If the software tries to update the KEY, the IP reports an error through the Error FIFO. The error code is SwUpdateSecretKeyInProcess, 0x0003.
When HMAC sees errors, the IP reports the error via INTR_STATUS.hmac_err. The details of the error type is stored in ERR_CODE.
| Error | Value | Description |
|---|---|---|
SwPushMsgWhenShaDisabled | 0x1 | The error is reported when SW writes data into MSG_FIFO when SHA is disabled. It may be due to SW routine error, or FI attacks. |
SwHashStartWhenShaDisabled | 0x2 | When HMAC detects the CMD.start when SHA is disabled, it reports this error code. |
SwUpdateSecretKeyInProcess | 0x3 | Secret Key CSRs should not be modified during the hashing. This error is reported when those CSRs are revised in active. |
SwHashStartWhenActive | 0x4 | The error is reported when CMD.start is received while HMAC is running. |
SwPushMsgWhenDisallowed | 0x5 | After CMD.process is received, the MSG_FIFO should not by updated by SW. This error is reported in that case. |
If the FIFO_FULL interrupt occurs, it is recommended the software does not write more data into MSG_FIFO until the interrupt is cleared and the status STATUS.fifo_full is lowered. Whilst the FIFO is full the HMAC will block writes until the FIFO has space which will cause back-pressure on the interconnect.